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FOREWORD: WHY RETRY? REVIVING 
DORMANT RACIAL JUSTICE CLAIMS 
Martha Minow* 
"A patched and leaky vase may be less desirable than an unbroken vase, 
but it is better than a pile of shards." 
- Marc Galanter1 
Two familiar arguments oppose lawsuits and legislative efforts to 
address racial injustices from our national past,2 and a third tacit 
argument can be discerned. "Why open old wounds?": this question 
animates the first argument. The evidence is stale - this expresses the 
second argument. The third, less explicit objection reflects worries that 
exposing some gross and unremedied racial injustices from the past 
will reveal the scale of imperfections in the systems of justice and gov­
ernment and thereby undermine the legitimacy of those systems. To 
introduce the meticulous and passionate essays in this Colloquium, I 
elaborate and respond to each of these questions. Like the 
Colloquium authors, I think it far more important that public attention 
come to these issues than that any particular remedy be secured. For 
inattention has been the insult laid upon the injuries of the past. 
I. WHY OPEN OLD WOUNDS? 
Reopening old wounds is treated as an argument against litigation 
when time has passed since the underlying events. To some, even two 
years can seem like sufficient time for injuries to recede into a past 
that should not be disturbed. One editorial writer recently urged a 
* Professor, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1975, University of Michigan; Ed.M. 1976, Har­
vard University; J.D. 1979, Yale. - Ed. 
1. Marc Galanter, Righting Old Wrongs, in MARTHA MINOW, BREAKING THE CYCLES 
OF HATRED 107, 124 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2002). 
2. In 2001, the criminal justice system prosecuted Thomas Blanton for the deaths of 
Denise McNair, Carole Robertson, Cynthia Wesley, and Addie Mae Collins, four young 
African-American girls, in the bombing of a Birmingham, Alabama church. Robert 
Chambliss was also convicted of the bombing in 1977. See Stephanie McCrummen, The Ver­
dier: Guilty: Jury Convicts Man in '63 Church Bombing That Killed 4 Girls, NEWSDA Y (Long 
Island), May 23, 2002, at A7. For detailed consideration of this and similar efforts, see 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1141 (2003); Richard Delgado, White 
Interests and Civil Rights Realism: Rodrigo's Bittersweet Epiphany, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1201 
(2003); Margaret M. Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Justice, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 1225 (2003); and Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial-Again: 
African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
1269 (2003). 
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district attorney to drop a potential prosecution that arose when a 
homeless couple accidentally started a fire in a vacant warehouse that 
led to the death of six firefighters.3 "All a trial would accomplish now 
is to reopen old wounds in a city that has already spent two years 
grieving. "4 
In that situation, the pursuit of justice seems to interrupt or 
undermine a process of mourning, a process that involves ceremonies, 
memorials, grief, and private memory.5 Though blame could be found, 
the editorial argued that the wrongdoers needed no trial because they 
already suffered "the hell of living with what they have done."6 This 
notion that wrongdoers have suffered enough, however, is absent 
when the underlying harms arose not by negligence but hate, and 
when the wrongdoers actually boast about their behavior and remain 
unrepentant. 
Sometimes the worry about reopening old wounds comes with the 
acknowledgment that the conflicts are still raw. Proposed trials could 
"reopen old wounds and plunge the country back into civil war," 
commented one observer after representatives of the United Nations 
withdrew from plans to set up a special court to prosecute former 
leaders of the Khmer Rouge for 1.7 million deaths in Cambodia 
during the 1970s.7 Although the underlying events reach back several 
decades, civil war persisted until 1998.8 It seems therefore a bit odd to 
talk of "old wounds." Perhaps people warn against reopening the 
conflicts precisely because they are so fresh and barely ended. In other 
words, arguments against opening old wounds - whether in 
Cambodia, the United States, or elsewhere - may stand in for worry 
about current social disorder and the fragility of peace. Yet however 
uncomfortable discussions of the racial past may be in this country, 
can there be any honest worry about social instability if we address the 
old wounds concerning racial violence of the 1960s and 1970s? Of 
course, addressing past racial violence has a bearing on the present 
day examinations of affirmative action, racial profiling, and other 
social policies, but basic peace and social order are not in jeopardy. 
Some worry that assessing past incidents risks undermining current 
efforts to build trust across racial lines. Shootings killed two white 
3. Adrian Walker, A Trial For What?, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. I, 2002, at Bl. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Irwin Arieff Ta Mok, UN Walks Out of Cambodia Talks on War Crimes Courts, THE 
INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 9, 2002, at 13. Cambodian and U.N. negotiators subsequently 
reached a tentative agreement to create a tribunal to prosecute former Khmer Rouge lead­
ers for genocide. See Ellen Nakashima, Pact Raises Hope in Cambodia for Khmer Rouge 
Trials, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2003, at A26. 
8. Mok, supra note 7. 
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police officers and a black youth, allegedly a gang member, over a 
two-week period in August of 2002 in Minneapolis, Minnesota.9 Given 
long-standing friction between white police officers and African 
Americans in Minneapolis, one editorial warned that evaluation of 
each incident would risk reopening memories of prior incidents, 
clouding judgments about the present, and dissolving current efforts to 
build trust between the police and the community.10 Once again, this 
kind of worry cannot be raised in the notable recent efforts to bring 
litigation or seek reparations concerning civil rights abuses of the 
1960s and 1970s or slavery. Indeed, it is precisely because of growing 
trust and real progress toward fairness and objectivity in the local legal 
systems that current-day efforts turn to these systems for redress for 
unremedied racial injustices. 
Perhaps criminal prosecutions or any kind of adversarial litigation 
hold special jeopardy for opening old wounds from racial injustice. 
This point animates some features of the restorative justice move­
ment, an international effort of theorists and practitioners, to engage 
victims and community members with wrongdoers in forward-looking 
processes of justice-seeking reparations and healing.11 Is it a legitimate 
concern that focusing the machinery of justice on past, unremedied 
racial harms could produce pain for the perpetrators? Racial riots 
ripped York, Pennsylvania, in 1969, wounding sixty people; a white 
mob killed Lillie Belle Allen, a preacher's daughter.12 Despite the 
filing of criminal charges, the prosecutions lay dormant for thirty years 
until local newspapers revived the matter; prosecutors then reopened 
the investigation. One man, apparently involved in killing Allen, 
called to assist the prosecutors but then committed suicide.13 
The costs of adversarial justice might seem unwarranted if repara­
tions and healing are genuine alternatives. But what are the possibili­
ties for personal and communal healing after racial violence? This 
question animates the international restorative justice movement. Its 
9. Editorial, Take A Breath: Cops, Community Must Work Together, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Aug. 17, 2002, at 20A. 
10. Id. 
11. See RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Burt Gallaway & Joe 
Hudson eds., 1996); Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored 
Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 292-93 (2001) (summarizing the restorative 
justice movement). 
12. Ex-Mayor Acquitted, 2 Convicted in '69 Race Killing, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 20, 2002, 
at 807; see also Combined News Services, Still Guilty in Some Eyes: Town Divided in Ac­
quittal of Mayor in 1969 York Race Riot, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 2002, at Al2; Jennifer McMen­
amin, 2 Convicted in York Case Handed Prison Sentences: Pair of White Men Guilty in Black 
Woman's Death Get at Least 4 112, 9 Years, BALT. SUN, Dec. 19, 2002, at 3A. 
13. McMenamin, supra note 12. One of the police officers at the time, Charlie Robert­
son, later admitted that he shouted "white power" at a gang rally. Others blamed him for 
encouraging gunmen to shoot blacks during the riots. Robertson later was elected mayor for 
two terms; he also later apologized for his earlier racial views. Id. 
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adherents argue that restoring the dignity of individuals and the 
harmony of communities should be the goal of justice. Exemplified by 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC"), 
restorative justice does not mean doing nothing, but it may mean 
pursuing alternatives to criminal prosecutions and civil trials.14 Hence, 
to fulfill the aspiration of building a bridge between the Apartheid era 
and the vision of a new democratic South Africa, the TRC held 
hearings to give victims and survivors opportunities to tell their 
stories. The TRC also considered applications for amnesty from 
perpetrators of human rights violations, whether committed by police 
and government officials or by freedom fighters and resisters of the 
Apartheid regime. Some critics attacked the TRC for supplanting 
criminal prosecutions.15 Yet still others opposed the TRC and its 
hearings because they would reopen old wounds. Judge Richard 
Goldstone of South Africa's Constitutional Court noted that he heard 
such complaints from many white South Africans: 
To whose wounds, I have wondered, are they referring? Surely not their 
own. And, what makes them think that the wounds of the victims have 
healed? And yet, when I said this to the playwright Ariel Dorfman, he 
corrected me in his always gentle and wise manner. He pointed out that 
those white South Africans are also victims of apartheid. Their discom­
fort with the truth is a symptom of their shame and that, too, makes them 
victims.16 
Does this generous view from South Africa warn against legal 
responses to past racial injustice in America? Those who favor 
restorative justice could argue that whites along with blacks need the 
processes of social reconstruction that can emerge after a community 
faces its past. Criminal prosecution and civil litigation can also help 
communities face their past and establish how the current generation 
means to break from it. Rather than reopening old wounds, legal 
attention to past racial crimes could start the process of healing 
wounds that have festered for decades. Even the debate over whether 
to proceed with prosecutions, civil suits, or reparations can bring into 
the open secrets about the past, afford people on all sides a chance to 
tell the truth, explain their motivations and suffering, apologize, and 
make amends. 
14. For a longer discussion, see MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND 
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 53-90 (1998) 
[hereinafter MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS). 
15. See id. at 56, 81. 
16. Judge Richard Goldstone, Foreword to MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND 
FORGIVENESS, supra note 14, at ix, xii; see also JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 
(1963), reprinted in JAMES BALDWIN, COLLECTED ESSAYS 286 (1998) (exploring harms to 
whites from white supremacy). 
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Thus, arguments using the metaphor of "opening old wounds" 
should not halt contemporary efforts to pursue legal redress for past 
racial injustices. There is no risk of societal disorder at the level of a 
civil war to cause hesitation in such pursuits. On the other hand, nor is 
there such harmony and mutual understanding that lawsuits and 
reparations claims arising from past race-based injustices could fairly 
be charged with introducing conflict to otherwise happy communities. 
To the extent that whites as well as blacks feel victimized by the past, 
attention and examination would be better than doing nothing. Should 
the lawsuits or reparations struggles prove controversial, the emerging 
debates themselves offer a chance for people to air their views and 
learn about the views of others on issues that have enduring signifi­
cance and consequences for future relationships and rules. 
II. BUT THE EVIDENCE IS STALE 
An obvious objection to litigation proceeding decades after the 
underlying events occurred is that the evidence is stale, unreliable, or 
unavailable. The truth-seeking function of trials is jeopardized when 
evidence is absent or untrustworthy. With the passage of time, 
memories may become foggy or influenced by intervening events. 
Documents disappear. Witnesses die. Concerns about weakness in 
evidence underlie the statute of limitations that usually applies to any 
claim. Statutes of limitations also protect courts from excessive litiga­
tion and defendants from endless uncertainty about the possibility of 
future litigation. 
As powerful as these goals may be in most areas of law, they fade 
in the context of gross violations of human rights. In U.S. law, there is 
no statute of limitations restricting prosecutions for murder.17 There is 
no statute of limitations on the prosecution and punishment of the 
crime of genocide.18 The International Criminal Court Statute 
mandates that crimes within its jurisdiction "shall not be subject to any 
statute of limitations."19 European nations have joined a convention 
17. See MARY ANNE VOLLERS, GHOSTS OF MISSISSIPPI: THE MURDER OF MEDGAR 
EVERS, THE TRIALS OF BYRON DE LA BECKWITH, AND THE HAUNTING OF THE NEW 
SOUTH (1995); Todd Taylor, Exorcising the Ghosts of a Shameful Past: The Third Trial and 
Conviction of Byron de la Beckwith, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359 (1996). 
18. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, 
U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) (entered into force Nov. 11, 1970), available at http:/1157.150. 
195.3/LibertyX::URd7xUul5qE8QjU1V2QmZG8x; see Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The 
Crime of the Century: The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 23 
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 467, 488 (2001 ). 
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 29, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9, 37 l.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at 
http:/lwww.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2003); see 
Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the 
International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (2002). 
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exempting crimes against humanity as well as genocide from statutes 
of limitations.20 These exemptions from statutes of limitations reflect 
the recognition that some offenses are so serious that they deserve 
response whenever possible. They may also reflect the understanding 
that loss of memory and evidence are less likely where the offenses are 
extreme and heinous. The French Criminal Code, for example, adopts 
the view that crimes against humanity are "imprescriptible," meaning 
both exempt from the statute of limitations and unforgettable.21 
Although it is not uncontroversial to exempt some matters from stat­
utes of limitations,22 doing so reflects the commitment that "justice, no 
matter how late, can and will be served."23 Or, as Lord David Owen 
quoted Simon Wiesenthal who, in turn, attributed Robert Kennedy, 
"'Moral duties have no term.' "24 Here, as elsewhere, U.S. law should 
be informed by emerging international human rights ideas and accom­
plishments.25 The U.S. thus could learn from emerging international 
norms that set no time limit on the pursuit of justice for gross viola­
tions of human rights. 
Other considerations - such as the pursuit of social reintegration 
or reconciliation - may support the use of truth commissions rather 
than criminal prosecutions.26 Concerns about the passage of time, 
20. See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 18. The United States is not a party to the Convention 
on Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations. See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ 
treaty6.htm (last modified Oct. 9, 2001) (listing participants and signatories to the Conven­
tion). 
21. Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: De­
mocracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 74 & n.254 (1998); see C. PEN. ART. 
213-5 (1994), reprinted in THE FRENCH PENAL CODE OF 1994 AS AMENDED AS OF 
JANUARY 1, 1999, at 93 (Edward A. Tomlinson, trans., The American Series of Foreign Pe­
nal Codes No. 31, 1999). 
22. "The issue of whether crimes against humanity should be without any limitations period 
continues to divide France. One of France's foremost philosophers, who was also a Jewish Resis­
tance hero, answered the question resoundingly in the affirmative in his book, appropriately enti­
tled L 'fmprescriptibfe." Curran, supra note 21, at 74 & n.254. (citing VLADIMIR JANKELEVITCH. 
L'IMPRESCRIPTIBLE: PARDONNER? DANS L'HONNEUR ET LA DIGNITE (1986)). For a French legal 
scholar's similar conclusion, see Georges Levasseur, Les Crimes contre l'humanite et le probleme de 
fe11r prescription. 93 J. DE DROIT INT'L 259, 273-86 (1966). For a recent discussion of the issue in 
the context of Paul Touvier's trial, see Leila Sadat Wexler, Reflexions on the Trial of Vichy Col­
laborator Paul To11vier for Crimes Against Humanity in France. 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 191 (1995). 
23. Taylor, supra note 17, at 379. 
24. Lord David Owen, Reconciliation, Applying Historical Lessons to Modem Conflicts, 
19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 324, 329 (1995) (citing SIMON WIESENTHAL, JUSTICE NOT 
VENGEANCE 158 (1989)). 
25. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 2. 
26. See MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS, supra note 14, at 55-89, 
118-147; Rose Weston, Note, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Com­
mission Model to the Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 ARIZ. J. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 1017 {2001). 
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however, should not prevent concerted efforts to address mass injus­
tices whose effects persist. 
III. THE SCALE OF UNREMEDIED WRONGS COULD JEOPARDIZE 
FAITH IN THE SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE 
I suspect that implicit in objections to legal redress for past racial 
crimes and atrocities is the fear of acknowledging the extent of those 
crimes and the resulting scope of official failure to prevent or respond. 
Such acknowledgment would raise questions about the legitimacy and 
reliability of a legal system intended to enact justice. It could also 
reveal the extent of reliance upon and benefits from the past injustices 
in the lives of people who currently feel innocent and indeed, did not 
themselves commit the atrocities. Reopening past injustices for legal 
treatment, in turn, might cast doubt on the legitimacy of current 
allocations of power and privilege or call upon people to make amends 
for conduct of others who are long gone. Resistance to making such 
amends - and assertions that justice does not so demand - may 
reinforce opposition to efforts to litigate or pursue reparations for past 
racial injustices. Such resistance is summarized in an aphorism in the 
United States: "After all, we can't give back Manhattan."27 
Fair questions can be raised about what obligations current gen­
erations do or should have for the violations of their ancestors or 
those of their same race who preceded them.28 Why should children or 
grandchildren of wrongdoers or bystanders owe any duty to remedy 
their ancestors' failures? Why would legal rulings pressing such an 
obligation rooted in the past better advance justice than collective 
actions designed to redress present day inequities, regardless of their 
provenance? Yet those questions do not themselves justify barring 
lawsuits or legislative investigations into past racial injustice. Deter­
mining what happened is a vital step in the pursuit of justice; it 
precedes but does not determine the rationale for or scope of reme­
dies, nor indeed, who specifically should be liable. 
Some may worry that contemporary use of courts in matters about 
which courts remained silent for decades exposes the vulnerability of 
the judiciary to politics and prejudice. That vulnerability remains all 
too apparent to those who have waited long for justice. If the judiciary 
becomes active now in allowing hearings of neglected criminal and 
civil complaints from decades earlier, it can start to rectify its own 
failures from those earlier periods. In so doing, the courts can help 
establish reasons for current and future generations to lodge faith in 
them. This is surely in the interests of whites, blacks, and members of 
27. See Weston, supra note 26, at 1055 n.250. 
28. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4 (1992). 
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other minority groups.29 Yes, prosecutors and courts proceeding now 
when they did not do so in a timely fashion will expose their own 
failures - or in Marc Galanter's image, the patches and leaks in the 
vase. But, he continues, "When it comes to justice, we don't have the 
choice of the unbroken vase. A patched and blemished world is the 
only one we can attain."30 Rather than dwell in the broken shards of 
justice, let us do the work of repair. The poignant and powerful essays 
in this Colloquium are part of that important work. 
29. See Delgado, supra note 2. 
30. Galanter, supra note 1, at 124. 
